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RACE, FAMILY, AND OBLIGATION
One version of black community self-help calls
upon middle-class members of the black
community, namely those who are better off
financially, have better than average educations,
etc., to help those members of the community
who are less fortunate. And the reason that
middle-class blacks ought to provide this
assistance, so the claim goes, is because they
have a moral obligation to do so.
This obligation on the part of middle-class
blacks is a consequence of their having
membership in the same racial family as other
blacks who are less fortunate. So, much the
same way we feel obligated to help members of
our family who are less fortunate, middle-class
blacks should feel obligated to help the less
fortunate members of their racial family. And a
feeling of obligation based on race-family
membership has long been a part of the black
community. Further, if this feeling of a race-
family obligation helps to facilitate the
betterment of the black community, this notion
of a race-family obligation might turn out to be
morally justified. It is not difficult to see, then,
**********1**********
that this notion of a race-family obligation has a
certain appeal.
On the other hand, one might object to this
version of a black self-help morality by claiming
that the notion of a racial family is inconsistent
with our intuitions about the kind of group we
take to be a family. For example, races of
people are much larger than the groups we
normally like to think of as families, and, even
if we were willing to grant a kind of family
status to such a large group, we would not want
to have a moral obligation like the one we
associate with our families to apply to such a
group. Hence, there appears to be a tension
between the familial obligation model of black
community self-help and our intuitions about
families.
My aim in this paper is to ease the tension
between the familial obligation model of black
community self-help and our intuitions about
families by sketching a plausible conception of
family that can account for race-families,
inclusive of a moral obligation between its
members, and remain consistent with our
intuitions about what families are.
**********2**********
I begin by examining two popular conceptions
of family, both of which I argue seem
problematic in light of the two criteria I bring to
bear upon them; namely, the ability to sustain a
moral obligation between family members
within its conception of family, and the ability
to account for race-families. While the criterion
of being able to account for race-families is
clearly controversial, I think the requirement of
a moral obligation between family members is
generally accepted as a necessary part of the
family concept. In fact, it seems in no small
part due to the general acceptance of the moral
obligation criterion that the race-family
conception remains so contentious. That is,
since a race-family conception cannot sustain a
moral obligation between its members, races of
people therefore cannot be considered families.
I
The first conception of family to be considered
is centered around the notion of causality.
There is a sense in which invoking causality
with respect to families seems intuitively
appealing. Since one way in which we define
families includes the existence of offspring, it is
**********3**********
not uncommon for young couples to be asked:
"When are you two going to start a family?"
This question seems to imply that without the
existence of children there is no family. If a
young couple has not yet caused the existence of
at least one other human being, there seems to
be a sense in which the couple alone does not
constitute a family. So, at least at first glance,
invoking the notion of causality with respect to
family appears reasonable.
A view of family that appeals to the notion of
causality has been suggested by Anthony
Appiah. Appiah thinks that a "rational defense
of the family ought to appeal to the causal
responsibility of the biological parent and the
common life of the domestic unit".l Thus, on
what I shall call the causal view, the family
consists of what we commonly take to be the
immediate or nuclear family: the parent, or
parents, together with their biological offspring
and this group's life together. Appiah thinks
that since natural parents are causally
responsible for their offspring, this causal
relationship provides the basis for moral claims.2
Thus, on the causal view, a family is defined by
two criteria: (1) the existence of a biological
**********4**********
parent or parents and one or more children, and
(2) this group's common life together as a
domestic unit.
It seems clear, then, that the causal view does
not allow for race-families and hence does not
satisfy our second criterion, since such families
would lack the necessary causal relation between
parent and child, as well as the common life of
a domestic unit. Further, there seems to be at
least one problem with the causal view with
respect to its ability to sustain a moral obligation
between family members, and consequently with
its ability to satisfy our first criterion.
One problem with the causal view is that it
seems open to regress. For example, if one
argues that due to my having caused the
existence of my daughter, that it is therefore
possible for moral claims to arise from this
relationship, then can we not also say that moral
claims might arise from the relationship between
my mother and my daughter? After all, if it
were not for my mother, my daughter certainly
would not exist. Granted, the causal link is not
a direct one, however, it is a necessary one. It
is a necessary condition of my daughter's
**********5**********
existence for my mother to have first caused my
existence. It might seem to follow, therefore,
that if moral importance is based upon
causation, then moral importance can be placed
on the relationship between my mother and my
daughter as well as on the relationship between
my daughter and myself. Hence, if moral
claims can arise from the parent/child
relationship, it seems that they can also arise
from the grandparent/grandchild relationship as
well.
But then what of the great-grandparents?
Certainly without the causal relationship
between my grandmother and my mother the
causal relationship between my daughter and I
could never have taken place. Hence the causal
view seems to take us far beyond the relatively
small domestic unit consisting only of biological
parents and their offspring, and forces us to
recognize all prior causal relationships as having
moral obligations attached to them. The causal
view, then, appears to be open to regress.
Of course the defender of the causal view might
object to the claim that her view is open to
regress, saying that, since there exists only a
**********6**********
finite number of causal agents, the regress is not
infinite, and therefore not vicious. However,
even if we grant that the regress is not a vicious
one, it still remains that by establishing moral
obligations beyond those derived from the
parent/child relationship, the family that results
is extended beyond the limits set by the causal
view's criteria, namely that we must include as
members of the family individuals who may not
be a part of the domestic unit. Thus, if the
causal view is to meet the regress objection its
conception of family must be reformulated.
So it seems that the causal view requires
additional justification in order to satisfy even
the first of the two criteria we are considering.
As it stands, the causal view seems to have
difficulty in sustaining a moral obligation
between family members within its conception
of the family.
Another objection to the causal view's
conception of family is that current-day
domestic situations like heterosexual or
homosexual adults with adopted children, are
excluded from the family concept. It is not
surprising, therefore, that gay and feminist
**********7**********
factions have criticized the causal view and have
instead offered as families groups that, according
to Appiah, "could (and sometimes do) occupy
the same sort of role"3 as what we have
described above as immediate or nuclear
families. These critics of the nuclear family
hold that once the broad outlines of the
archaeology of the family concept have been
revealed, we are forced to reconsider the nuclear
family as the only legitimate conception of
family. Appiah thinks that if these critics are
correct, then their view of the family must be
that of a group which provides "a mode of
organization of life and feeling that subserves
certain positive functions". 4 I take it that this
mode of organization, in fulfilling the "same sort
of role" as the nuclear family, can be viewed as
a family based in part upon the second of the
two criteria set forth in the causal view. That is,
a group can be considered a family in part
because it maintains the "common life of the
domestic unit". Clearly, then, if we accept this
notion of family based upon the idea that if a
group shares a common life and certain feelings,
presumably of an intimate nature, and this
combination of cohabitation and feelings
"subserves certain positive functions", then we
**********8**********
may be able to consider this group a family
without the necessary condition of biological
causality that is the basis of the causal view.
Thus, under what I shall call the common life
view, a family is defined by a single criterion,
namely, that: (1) the group in question share a
common life and feelings which together
subserve certain positive functions.
The common life view, then, allows us to
include groups, with or without children, that
were formerly denied consideration as families
on the causal view. But while the broadening of
the family conception that results in moving
from the causal view to the common life view
may seem initially appealing, on this view any
group, regardless of their biological relations or
causal connectedness, can, given the appropriate
lifestyle and feelings, be considered a family.
Given the potential for fairly large family
groups, the family as conceived under the
common life view may allow for families that
are inconsistent with our intuitions about family.
Of course these groups would not be as large as
an entire race of people. And since it hardly
seems plausible to think that an entire race of
people could share a common life together, even
**********9**********
if we could argue that as a group it subseIVes a
positive function, the notion of race-families is
excluded from the common life conception of
family. Nevertheless, these large groups
conceived as families under the common life
view may have difficulty in sustaining a moral
obligation between family members within its
conception of the family.
Consider the crew of an aircraft carrier. Since
there seems to be no temporal component to the
common life view of a family, i.e. the group of
people so construed need not have had a
common life together for any particular length
of time, and the feelings associated with the
group need not necessarily be of a maternal,
paternal or sexual nature, and further, that the
functions which this group subseIVes need only
be "positive",s it therefore seems conceivable
that the crew of an aircraft carrier could be
construed as a family under the common life
conception. The crew might spend several years
together enduring long periods of time at sea.
Hence, these individuals are clearly sharing a
common life; so they are in this sense a
"domestic unit". Intimate feelings are likely to
result since it is not unreasonable to expect that
**********10**********
such feelings would develop under arduous at-
sea conditions. Also, these feelings, and the
bonds which arise from them, can easily be seen
as subserving a positive function in the lives of
the crew-members - if nothing else these
feelings aid the crew-members in enduring their
sea-going existence. Therefore, it seems that
under the common life view we might regard
the crew of an aircraft carrier as a family.
But notice how broad our conception of family
has become. Given the approximate size of an
aircraft carrier crew, in the neighborhood of five
thousand people including the air wing (i.e. the
aircraft crew, pilots, maintenance personnel,
etc.), we would end up with a very large family
indeed. Further, and more importantly, how do
we sustain moral obligations between the
members of this family? Do we really want our
familial obligations to be this far-reaching?
What happens when people transfer to and from
the ship, do our familial obligations to any given
individual remain even after they have left the
ship? If so, then any member of the aircraft
carrier crew with whom we spent time onboard
would have to be considered a family member,
**********11**********
and thus we would have some moral obligation
to those individuals.
So it seems that more explanation is required
from the common life view if we are to make
sense of cases like the aircraft carrier example
vis-a-vis the kind of group we take to be a
family. I think that the family conception I
outline below provides a description of the kind
of group we take to be a family, and meets the
criteria we set out to satisfy.
II
I take it as a fact of human nature that people
recognize resemblances between themselves and
other people. It would seem ludicrous for
someone to say of themselves that they stood
unique in the world and had no resemblance to
anyone else in any way. The fact that one
considers oneself a person in itself implies some
sort of resemblance between themselves and
others. Thus, that a person recognizes
resemblances between themselves and other
people seems entirely reasonable.
**********12**********
In outlining our resemblances, I think we can
divide them into three types: biological,
psychological, and historical.6 Under biological
resemblances we might include such things as
appearance and lineage. Appearance seems best
illustrated in the case of identical twins. It
could never be the case that either of the twins
would not recognize a resemblance with respect
to appearance between themselves and their
sibling. Recognition of one's lineage seems a
bit more complex. For example, recognition of
a resemblance of lineage between myself and
my biological mother is fairly straight forward,
in fact it may be assisted in some cases by our
resemblance in appearance as well. However,
recognizing a resemblance of lineage with
someone born two hundred years ago may not
come quite so easily. Only after discovering the
possibility of a resemblance between myself and
this other person is bolstered, perhaps by
research, discussion with other persons who I
already recognize as resembling me with respect
to lineage, and perhaps by viewing pictures of
that person, thus invoking again the resemblance
of appearance to supplement the notion of lineal
resemblance, do I come to recognize this
**********13**********
resemblance of lineage between myself and my
ancestor.
Under the second type of resemblance,
psychological, we might consider such things as
character and political ideology. When I
recognize that some other person and myself are
both very thrifty individuals, for example, I
recognize that this other person is like me in this
particular respect, we share a particular character
trait. Likewise, someone may hold the same or
similar political views that I do, and
consequently I recognize that with respect to our
political views, we resemble one another.
The third type of resemblance is historical. We
might include as historical resemblances shared
life experiences, whether shared by individuals
together or separately. For example, another
person and I may have grown up together
through childhood and into adulthood; again this
might best be illustrated by a sibling, but it
could also be a next-door neighbor.
Alternatively, it might be someone with whom
I shared a particular life tragedy, say for
example that myself and another person both
lost a parent at a very early age. In any case, its
**********14**********
seems hard to imagine not recognizing these
types of resemblances to other people with
respect to a given shared life experience.
It might be objected at this point that, although
the aforementioned resemblances are
recognizable, we might have difficulty in
accommodating an idea like culture which seems
to transcend the boundaries of the particular
resemblance categories we have mentioned.
However, culture, I think, is simply a
combination of resemblances. On the one hand
there are the particular traits that are said to be
associated with certain cultures, for example a
psychological resemblance with respect to
religious beliefs. On the other hand, there are
certain historical resemblances such as common
life experiences. For example, I may have gone
through certain "rights of passage" from
childhood to adulthood in a particular culture.
Thus, it seems to be a combination of
resemblances that make up a culture, and we
recognize this particular combination of
resemblances in ourselves vis-a-vis other people
who we likewise recognize as having this
particular combination of resemblances.
**********15**********
The types of resemblances discussed give us a
broad sketch of how we view resemblances
between ourselves and others. However, it
should be noted that the degree to which we
recognize these resemblances varies. For
example, I may have a very high degree of
recognition for the biological resemblances
between myself and my father, but may
recognize some psychological resemblance
between myself and a stranger to only a very
small degree. Thus when we speak of
resemblances among people, we are talking
about the recognition, in various respects and to
differing degrees, of likenesses between them.
Since it seems clear that we recognize
resemblances between ourselves and others, even
if to varying degrees, it is reasonable, I think, to
suppose that we also recognize resemblances
between ourselves and groups of others as well.
Given that when we speak of families we are
speaking of groups of people, it does not seem
unreasonable to begin an account of families
based upon the resemblances outlined above.
Consider the two conceptions of family that we
have examined. Whether we view families from
a causal or a common life perspective, we must
**********16**********
admit of some resemblance between the
members of a family. If we look at families
causally, then there is necessarily a biological
resemblance. If we look at them as a group
sharing a common life, then there is necessarily
a historical resemblance. So, under either of
these views we must admit of a sense in which
families are groups of people who resemble one
another. But once we begin to view families as
groups of people who resemble one another, the
question arises as to what types of resemblances
obtain in a family such that we are able to
distinguish between groups that are families and
those that are not. Further, we need to explain
what role, if any, these resemblances play in
establishing familial obligation.
I should like to begin by suggesting that the
language of family is fairly broad. By definition
a family might be a collection or union of things
which have a common source or similar
features, e.g., a family of languages. Although
this clearly seems inappropriate with respect to
how we think of human families, this broad
interpretation of family nevertheless confirms.
the notion that families are groups whose
members share resemblances. Given this broad
**********17**********
interpretation we might be inclined, once we
restrict our conception of family to human
beings, to consider all of humankind as a family.
But even though this sense of family is
consistent with at least one way we think of
families, Le. the family of humankind, without
any obligation between the members of this
group, the notion of all of humankind as a
family seems vacuous.
We can, I think, base our conception of the
human family on two criteria, the fulfillment of
which will establish membership in the family,
namely: (1) the biological resemblances
between members of the human species, and (2)
the psychological resemblance of a sense of
obligation between members of the human
species. The first criterion should be accepted
without much fear of objection. Surely the very
basis for distinguishing one species from another
is found by examining biological characteristics.
The second criterion, however, leads us to an
important point in our discussion, the point at
which we must suggest a way in which
obligations between members of groups might
be established. If we can provide a plausible
account of obligation in the case of the human
**********18**********
family, we might then be able to make use of
this account in trying to suggest a conception of
racial families.
Kurt Baier suggests what seems to be a highly
plausible account of moral obligation. On
Baier's view, obligations are ascribed to persons
by way of directives, that is, "the content of
speech acts capable of guiding those to whom it
applies ... to action. ,,7 Moral directives are those
directives which, "other things being equal, it
would be (morally) wrong for the addressee not
to follow", that is, "the person to whom they
apply (morally) ought to follow."s For example:
[i]f it is morally wrong to pass by when
an injured motorist calls out for help,
then in such a situation one has a moral
obligation to give such help. Putting it
more generally, we can say that
whenever a wrong-claim indicates a task
to someone, then it constitutes a moral
directive and being the addressee of such
a moral directive amounts to having a
moral obligation.9
On Baier's view, then
obligations arise when and only when a
morally binding directive gives rise ... to
a task, whether merely self-disciplinary
or also productive ... [what transforms an
**********19**********
assignment into a task in the case of
moral obligations] is either the
temptation of the addressee to do what
the directive forbids ... or the effort
needed to perform the productive task
which the directive enjoins (repair
damage done).l0
An obligation claim has moral binding force,
and hence is morally binding, if
'It is not solely the addressee's business
to decide whether or not to follow the
directive' ... [that is, such directives]
concern themselves with issues and
problems whose solution is not solely the
agent's business but also that of others
who have a legitimate concern about
whether or not the person to whom such
a directive applies follows it or not.l!
Thus the claim "'Do K' has moral binding
force", is construed by Baier as implying that
"Do K" "is a directive in regard to which there
ought to be a person whose job it is to ensure
that all those [who are] addressees of the
directive .. follow it."12
Hence, if we take to be morally wrong the
directive "All humans kill each other", which
addresses all members of the species, then this
constitutes a moral directive that establishes a
**********20**********
morally binding obligation between all members
of the species to refrain from killing each other.
If we grant the plausibility of Baier's account of
obligation, we can see how a moral obligation
(in this case the obligation to refrain from
killing) between all members of the human
species might be established. This moral
obligation, then, along with the aforementioned
biological resemblances, satisfies the two criteria
that we set forth for distinguishing the family of
humankind from families as such. It would no
doubt be objected, of course, that even if we
grant this somewhat obvious distinction between
families of "things" and families of persons, this
broad conception of the family of humankind
clearly does not capture the notion of family we
seek. What is required, then, are some further
distinguishing features that will enable us to
characterize as families those groups that we
take to be families, but which the causal and
common life views failed to adequately account
for. Let us call these groups intimate families.13
In order to distinguish our intimate family from
the larger family of humans to which we all
belong, let us consider two additional criteria.
**********21**********
Building on the criteria for the human family,
we can state the further criterion for the intimate
family as: (3) a set of resemblances, usually
biological, and almost always psychological and
historical, such that an individual represents a
member of one or more of those groups which
we take to be fundamental to the successful
continuation of society, wherein there is a moral
obligation between the individual and the other
group members. This third criterion allows us
to distinguish between the group/family of
humans and smaller groups which seem
consistent with how we commonly think of
families, e.g., as a group consisting of a mother,
a father, and one or more children. In effect,
intimate families are subgroups, or subfamilies
if you will, of the human family.
We can see at this point that, unlike the causal
view, the intimate family concept as thus far
described seems to easily allow for gay couples,
adopted children, in-laws, etc. In contrast to the
causal view, on what I call the resemblance
view, a group of individuals need not have a
causal biological link to be considered a
legitimate family. Further, given the
requirement that the group be fundamental to the
**********22**********
successful continuation of society, we seem to
avoid having to allow as families groups larger
than our intuitions will allow.
As to the moral obligation between members of
the intimate family, we might again employ
Baier's account of moral obligation. For
example, if we hold that the directive "All
members of those groups which we take to be
fundamental to the successful continuation of
society, that is, those groups which are
paramount to the training and maturation of
members of the human species, work against
each other to the detriment of society" is
morally wrong, then this constitutes a moral
directive that establishes a morally binding
obligation between the members of those groups
to work with each other for the good of society.
The second criterion to be added is: (4) a
family disposition (FD) between the members of
the group. What I call a FD arises from the
strong sense of emotional and moral
identification that we have with our intimate
families. This identification with our intimate
families arises, I think, as a result of the
resemblances which obtain between family
**********23**********
members. Though we share the requisite human
family resemblances with some stranger, e.g.,
the resemblances which we have with our
biological mother, who loved and nurtured us
and who has been a part of our lives since birth,
are such that a very intense emotional and moral
identification obtains between my mother and I
which is not even conceivable with respect to
the stranger. Hence, I am likely to be disposed
differently towards my mother than I would be
towards a stranger.
When a FD is present, a moral prioritization
occurs with respect to those individuals amongst
whom the FD obtains. This moral prioritization
makes our obligation towards our intimate
family special in a very real, although perhaps
not always morally justifiable, sense. Hence, a
special obligation obtains between intimate
family members which does not obtain in the
case of others. Consequently, we give moral
priority to members of our intimate family over
others.14 So if we suppose that, all other things
being equal, I must choose between helping a
stranger and helping my mother, I would,
because of my FD towards her, choose to help
my mother rather than the stranger:s
**********24**********
I would, however, like to address one concern
with respect to priority which I think will help
clarify my preference for the term "intimate"
over the term "immediate" in characterizing
what we intuitively take to be families. As was
noted above, the causal view runs into difficulty
once individuals who do not have a causal
biological relation to each other are considered
for membership in the immediate family.
Similarly, on the common life account,
individuals whom we do not live with are
excluded from family membership, and hence
from coming under any familial obligation. This
difficulty is avoided, however, in the case of the
intimate family on the resemblance account.
Suppose I live in New York and I have a cousin
who lives in Brazil. Because we lack the
requisite causal relation and we do not live
together, she is excluded from my immediate
family on both the causal and common life
accounts. Despite having only spent a few
summers together (perhaps on the beaches of
Rio), my cousin and I consider ourselves quite
close. In fact, we share a great deal of each
other's lives by way of telephone conversations
and written correspondence. It seems, then, that
**********25**********
I might consider my cousin part of my
immediate family, even though she fails to be
"immediate" either in the sense of a causal
relation or in the sense of physical proximity.
On the resemblance account, however, my
cousin can easily be considered a member of my
intimate family along with my biological
mother, my stepfather, my half-brother, and my
paternal uncle. My cousin comes under the
weight of the familial obligation as outlined in
the third criterion for intimate families, and
further, I have the strong emotional and moral
identification with her which gives rise to a
feeling of a special obligation or FD towards
her.
I should point out that not everyone, for
whatever reason, will want to include such
individuals as my cousin as part of my intimate
family. They might argue that the FD can, or at
least should, only arise with respect to certain
individuals. This difficulty can be explained, I
think, by drawing a distinction between what I
call an internal family disposition (IFD) and an
external family disposition (EFD). An IFD
exists when two or more members of a family
group acknowledge a mutual sense of moral
**********26**********
prioritization between themselves, and thus
consider themselves members of an intimate
family. Hence, my cousin and I each consider
the other as part of our intimate family. In
contrast, the objector lacks an EFD. That is, the
objector fails to endorse the acknowledgement
of a mutual sense of moral prioritization
between my cousin and I. The objector,
therefore, rejects the idea that a feeling of a
special obligation or FD ought to exist in the
case of my cousin and I. So, both the objector
and I can consider my cousin in Brazil as
somehow "family", perhaps in the sense that we
are blood relations,16 but the objector holds the
view that my cousin and I are not intimate
family, while my cousin and I feel and act as
members of an intimate family.
Having thus sketched the resemblance view of
family, we can summarize this account as
follows. Intimate families are groups in which:
(1) the members of the group share in the
biological resemblances of the human species,
(2) the members of the group share the
psychological resemblance of a sense of moral
obligation between members of the human
species, (3) the members of the group share a
**********27**********
set of resemblances, usually biological, and
almost always psychological and historical, such
that each member is representative of one or
more of those groups which we take to be
fundamental to the successful continuation of
society, wherein there is a moral obligation
between the group members, and (4) the
members of the group share a family disposition
(FD).
The resemblance view of family, then, provides
us with a conception of family that meets the
first of the two criteria we set out to satisfy, that
is, it gives us an account of family that is able
to sustain a moral obligation between family
members. Further, by using resemblance criteria
in distinguishing families as particular kinds of
social groups, and by suggesting an explanation
of the way in which the feeling of moral
prioritization between family members occurs,
the resemblance account satisfies our intuitions
about the kind of group that families are. What
remains, therefore, is an attempt to satisfy the
second criterion, that is, to show the
resemblance account's ability to provide a
plausible conception of race-families.
**********28**********
III
As might be expected, the conception of a race-
family on the resemblance view turns on the
resemblances between family members. We
begin, naturally, with the biological resemblance
of species and the psychological resemblance of
obligation to fellow members of the species that
distinguishes the human family from families as
such. In order to make the move from the
human family conception to a race-family
conception, we must add to these resemblances
other resemblances which apply to the concept
of racial commonality in order to distinguish
race-families from the human family. Further,
in order to suggest that race-families are
analogous to intimate families, we must generate
a moral obligation and a family disposition (FD)
between the members in order to create the kind
of moral prioritization between members of
race-families that we saw in our discussion of
intimate families.
Take any definition of race that you like,
inevitably we find that there is some notion of
resemblance underlying it. For example, take
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W.E.B. DuBois' definition of race. DuBois
defines race as
a vast family of human beings, generally
of common blood and language, always
of common history, traditions and
impulses, who are both voluntarily and
involuntarily striving together for the
accomplishment of certain more or less
vividly conceived ideals of life. I?
Notice that in calling for a vast "family" of
human beings, there seems to be a sense in
which DuBois embraces the notion of race-
families. Further, his characterization of this
family seems to be a set of resemblances. First,
DuBois calls for common blood between
members of the race. If I take DuBois' use of
the term "common blood" correctly, he means a
biological resemblance of lineage. Second,
DuBois calls for common language and
impulses, and the striving for particular ideals;
which all seem to be psychological
resemblances. Lastly, DuBois holds that the
members of a race share a common history and
tradition, both of which are historical
resemblances. Hence, on DuBois' view, we
should think of groups of people who share in
the resemblances he outlines as a race;
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moreover, given his characterization of races as
a "vast family", perhaps as a race-family.
A simpler, and I think more straight-forward,
definition of race, of the black race in particular,
has been proposed by Bernard BoxilI. Boxill
thinks that "insofar as black people are a race,
they are people who either themselves look
black - that is, have a certain kind of physical
appearance - or are, at least in part, descended
from such a group ofpeople."18 We can see that
on Boxill's view, a race consists solely of the
biological resemblances of appearance and
lineage.
So, if the versions of race given by DuBois and
Boxill are illustrative of how we conceive of
particular groups of people that we call races,
then however we decide to distinguish between
racial groups, the distinguishing characteristics
we invoke will be reducible to various kinds of
resemblances. Ido not think, however, that any
moral obligation, apart from any which may
apply to all members of the human family, can
be derived from these resemblances alone.
Consequently, we must provide some additional
resemblance criteria in order to gain a sufficient
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basis for establishing a moral obligation and FD
between members of a race.
Given the history of slavery, lynching and
disenfranchisement, Le. oppression, associated
with individuals taken to be members of the
black race, it seems clear that blacks share
certain resemblances which are of a particularly
intense nature. Even in the present day, the
oppression of blacks, which perpetuates their
political and economic unempowerment,
remains. As Justice Thurgood Marshall has
noted
It is unnecessary in 20th century
America to have individual Negroes
demonstrate that they have been victims
of racial discrimination; the racism of
our society has been so pervasive that
none, regardless of wealth or position,
has managed to escape its impact. The
experience of Negroes in America has
been different in kind, not just in degree,
from that of other ethnic groups. It is
not merely the history of slavery alone
but also that a whole people were
marked as inferior by the law. And that
mark has endured.19
If Mr. Justice Marshall is correct in his
assessment of blacks, and I think that few would
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deny that he is, and we take the oppression of
groups in general to be morally wrong, then it
follows that the oppression of blacks as a group
is morally wrong. Drawing again on our
discussion of moral obligation, we might suggest
that, just as the moral directive "Help those in
need" gives rise to an obligation to help an
injured motorist who is stranded and asks for
help, the moral directive "Stop the oppression of
blacks" gives rise to an obligation to help in
mitigating, if not eliminating, the tyranny which
the black race continues to endure. Hence it
would appear that blacks have moral
justification for acting in concert with each other
as a means of ending the oppression that they all
share.
But it seems that blacks have recognized this
obligation all along. According to William Van
Deburg, this shared oppression amongst blacks
has long been a catalyst for group action. On
Van Deburg's account of black history
Before the Civil War, for example, black
Americans worked to develop an
empowering sense of group identity by
distinguishing us from them - often to
startling effect. As they adjusted to the
reality of oppression, free blacks
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determined that it would be wise to
"combine and closely attend to their own
particular interest". Conscious of their
shared experiences and cultural traits [i.e.
their shared resemblances], they formed
fraternal, mutual aid, and cooperative
organizations to promote black solidarity
and aid in racial surviva1.20
Further, group action by blacks in response to
oppression and the obligation felt by blacks
towards each other, exists even today. David
Wilkins, in his discussion of an obligation on
the part of black professionals to the black
community at large, tells us that
For those blacks whose membership in
the black community is central to their
identity, recognizing the existence of
such an obligation promotes both a
healthy self-love and a firm foundation
for helping other blacks who are truly in
need. In a country filled with negative
images of black identity arid millions of
poor blacks, a theory that reinforces a
positive sense of black self-worth and
that encourages concrete action to help
blacks in need carries real moral
weight.21
We should note two things at this point. First,
the moral directive to help blacks, and hence the
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morally binding obligation which it entails, is
not exclusive to blacks. The obligation to end
the oppression of blacks falls on all those who
are in a position to reduce or eliminate that
oppression. If it is morally wrong to allow the
oppression of blacks to continue, then the moral
obligation to stop that oppression applies to all
moral agents. Given that whites are moral
agents, and further that as a group whites have
historically been the oppressors of blacks, whites
are clearly addressees of the moral directive, and
hence the morally binding obligation, to help
blacks. Hence, the task of helping blacks out of
their oppressed state falls firmly upon whites as
well as blacks.
Second, not only do the resemblances which
obtain between members of the black race
establish them as an oppressed group, and hence
bring them under the moral directive to stop the
oppression of groups, because of the strong
emotional and moral identification that results
from this shared oppression, these resemblances
are of sufficient intensity to give rise to a family
disposition (FD) between members of the black
race as well.
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If this is the case, then just as in the case of our
intimate family, the resemblances which obtain
between the members of the black race give rise
to a feeling of moral prioritization between its
members. Of course, this is not to say that this
sense of prioritization, that is, the FD which
arises between members of the black race, is
equal in intensity, necessarily, to the FD that
obtains between intimate family members.
Clearly, the resemblances which obtain in the
intimate family, if only by virtue of their very
intimate nature, seem likely to prompt a higher
level of concern for intimate family members
than do the resemblances associated with the
shared oppression that comes with membership
in the black race. However, the FD generated
between members of the black race is
nevertheless analogous to that of the intimate
family in that it yields a sense of moral priority
with respect to the care of members of the race-
family over nonmembers. Hence, on the
resemblance view of family, we can, I think, see
a sense in which the race-family conception
becomes plausible. On the resemblance account
we are able to explain both what families are
and what race-families are in a way that is
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consistent with our intuitions and which sustains
a moral obligation between family members.
However, one might object to the moral
prioritization between members of the black race
by claiming that such a view would be self-
defeating for blacks. Universalization of the
notion of giving moral priority to members of
one's own race would prove disadvantageous to
the black community. Bill Lawson, e.g., while
admitting that the notion of blacks as a family
has "deep psychological roots",22 nevertheless
challenges the race-family concept because he
thinks that
it is not a moral positIOn that black
Americans want to universalize. Blacks
do not want whites to be totally
committed to ... looking out for one's
racial family first. Most blacks want to
be treated as moral and social equals.
The appeal to race-as-family morality
would undermine the basic political and
moral principles that have been used to
get blacks what civil liberties they have
.... Blacks lack sufficient political and
economic power in America to push such
a moral position as a universal moral
principle. Races can still be considered
families, but we do not want that concept
to be the basis of moral obligation.23
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Lawson appears to be making two distinct
claims here. His first claim seems to be that
embracing the race-family conception is self-
defeating for black Americans since it "would
undermine the basic political and moral
principles that have been used to get blacks
what civil liberties they have". His second
claim seems to be that blacks do not have the
political and economic power to universally
implement a race-family morality. Since I have
nothing to say in opposition to Lawson's second
claim, as it seems clearly to be the case, I shall
only take issue with his first claim.
Of course having no objection to the second of
Lawson's claims is not to say that I do not find
it of importance. In fact, I think that the second
claim, given its consistency with the
aforementioned oppression of blacks, adds to the
force of my rejoinder to Lawson's first claim.
It is precisely because blacks lack sufficient
political and economic power in America that
they ought to embrace the race-family
conception. It is precisel y because of the
oppression of blacks that blacks need the help
which the solidarity of the race-family provides.
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As to the universalization of the race-family
concept, we should first consider that in working
together as a family, blacks are simply following
the "example of Euro-American groups ([e.g.]
the Irish) [by] promot[ing] their own
organizational activity"; though blacks are not
countenancing the notion that "their exclusive
effort necessarily separate[ s] them from the
concerns of the 'whole human family'".24 I
think that the problem Lawson envisions is the
result of his conception of moral prioritization
with respect to race-family obligations. Lawson
seems to think that the universalization of the
race-family conception would have a negative
effect on the accomplishments towards social
equality that blacks have made thus far because
whites, now invoking a race-family obligation of
their own, would place each other morally first,
and thereby relegate blacks to a situation
perhaps worse than their current one. However,
even though we tend to consider choosing an
intimate family member over a stranger when
circumstances are such that choosing the
intimate family member may seem inappropriate,
or even morally unjustified, we do not always
choose the family member. Thus, the priority
we place on family members is not absolute, and
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therefore the moral prioritization among race-
family members does not necessarily entail a
total commitment to considering one's own race-
family members first. So although blacks may
feel a special obligation (FD) towards fellow
members of the black race-family, the
prioritization of race-family members over
others is not necessarily absolute.
An almost trivial, although illustrative, example
of the dynamic nature of familial moral
prioritization might arise, again in the case of a
choice between my mother and a stranger.
Clearly, if my mother and the stranger have both
been in an automobile accident, and after being
the first to arrive on the scene I discover that
my mother has broken her leg and the stranger
is suffering from arterial bleeding, even though
my tendency may be to help my mother first, I
will no doubt stop the stranger's bleeding before
I consider helping my mother. Thus, "family
first" is not always the case.
Perhaps a more realistic example of the type of
prioritization which I think is implicit in the
resemblance account of race-families, and the
kind of prioritization that I think has already
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been demonstrated by other groups, might begin
by supposing that an intimate family member is
in dire financial need after just opening a new
business. Everything else being equal, I may
take it as an obligation to patronize my family
member's new business over all other businesses
(of the same type) as a means of helping my
family member. Thus I have given the family
member priority for no other reason than
because of my feeling of obligation and FD
towards him or her. Similarly, and as has been
done historically by other groups, one may, for
no other reason than that of a feeling of
obligation and FD towards a member of the
black community, show a sense of priority with
respect to members of the black race-family by
patronizing a black-owned business rather than
a white-owned one in an effort to enhance the
social and economic condition of the black race.
Further, given our discussion above, I think that
an argument could be made suggesting that this
particular manifestation of the obligation and FD
is at least morally acceptable. In addition, if we
take seriously the obligation to stop the
oppression of blacks, then in this case whites too
should consider patronizing black owned
businesses. Not that whites should patronize
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black owned businesses out of a FD arising from
the intense resemblances shared among blacks,
but because of the moral directive, and hence
the morally binding obligation, to help blacks
out of their oppressed state that applies to all
those who are in a position to provide such help.
Consider what is perhaps the classic statement
of a universal morality, Kant's categorical
imperative: "Act only on that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law."2S Clearly,
assistance to blacks (or for that matter to any
oppressed group) whether by blacks themselves
because of a race-family obligation, or by others
to whom the moral directive which is the basis
for that obligation applies, is sufficient grounds
for a maxim which we can will as a universal
law. The only question that remains, I think, is
whether or not the black middle-class will opt to
ignore its obligation to less fortunate members
of the black race-family and segregate itself
from those members of the black community
who are in need of their assistance, or whether
they will step forward and meet that obligation.
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NOTES
1. Appiah, p. 15. Although Appiah here
uses the singular "parent", since both parents
are causally responsible for any offspring, I
take him to mean the causal responsibility of
both parents,with the domestic unit consisting
of either one parent and a child, or a man, a
woman and a child.
2. Appiah, p. 16 n. 4.
3. Appiah, p. 15.
4. Appiah, p. 15.
5. Since Appiah does not specify what
functions constitute positive functions, I shall
assume that any function which does not
appear to be negative qualifies as positive.
6. No claim of a resemblance ontology is
being made herein.
7. Baier, p. 210.
8. Baier, p. 211, emphasis in the original.
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12. Baier, p. 224, emphasis in the original.
9. Baier, p. 212, emphasis in the original.
10. Baier, p. 213, emphasis in the original.
11. Baier, p. 223, emphasis in the original.
Baier argues that: "since the behavior of a
person who yields to the temptation to follow
self-interest and to ignore moral directives
will, ipso facto, detrimentally affect another
person's interests, the question of whether or
not he follows moral directives is ipso facto
not solely his business but someone else's as
well, namely, the business of the person whose
interest would be adversely affected. And
since such behavior, unless prevented, would
adversely affect the climate of life, whether or
not people follow moral directives, is
everyone's business (225)."
13. I shall use the term "intimate" rather
than "immediate" in discussing our intuitive
understanding of family, since, as we shall see
below, there are problems with regard to how
we prioritize our obligations such that those
who are "immediate" family may not have the
same moral standing as others with whom we
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are intimate.
14. There may be a concern here with
respect to the is/ought problem. As Lawrence
Becker points out, "[clommon sense morality
gives more weight to the interests of intimates
than to strangers, but moral theory has had
difficulty justifying that priority" (Becker, p.
177; Becker addresses what he calls the
priority problem at pp. 216-26, invoking the
notion of reciprocity as a means of solving it).
Although it seems that there might be many
instances in which we could morally justify a
priority to intimate family members, there will
no doubt be instances where priority is given
to our intimate family members even when it
is not justified morally. I am here attempting
only to suggest how it is that this prioritization
comes about, not to take on the larger task of
justifying the more contentious claim that there
ought to be such a prioritization.
15. A fuller account of the resemblance
view would go on to explain how a similar
dilemma between my mother and my father,
e.g., towards whom I have a similarly inspired
FD, might be resolved, perhaps by appealing
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to the intensity of specific resemblances and
explaining how a stonger FD towards my
mother might develop.
16. It should be noted that, in light of the
first three criteria for families, the resemblance
view clearly accounts for what we might call
"extended" families, however, I am here trying
to focus on what we take to be our immediate
family, Le. that group of individuals to whom
we have a special familial obligation.
17. DuBois, p. 21.
18. Box ill, p. 178.
19. Marshall, pp. 132-133.
20. Van Deburg, p. 34.
21. Wilkins, p. 2001.
22. Lawson, p. 98.
23. Lawson, p. 107.
24. Van Deburg, p. 35. Note Van
Deburg's use of the term "human family".
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25. Kant, p. 88.
26. I would like to thank Marion Smiley,
Daniel Hausman and Joseph Ellin for their
comments on earlier versions of this paper;
the Committee on Institutional Cooperation
(CIC) for financial support during the early
stages of the paper's development; the
Graduate School of the University of
Wisconsin-Madison for financial support
during the completion of the current version;
and Bill Lawson whose work inspired this
paper. An earlier version of this paper was
presented during the October 1994 CIC
Fellows Conference held at the University of
Minnesota.
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